Montreal Activists Promote “CamOver 2025,” Urging Coordinated Vandalism of Surveillance Cameras
Executive Summary
An anonymous post on MTL Counter-Info calls for a fall 2025 “CamOver” campaign in Montreal that gamifies the destruction of surveillance cameras and explicitly targets the SPVM’s planned use of BriefCam analytics. The communiqué promotes team-based vandalism, score-keeping, and posting “action reports,” mirroring a broader North American push by anti-surveillance networks to normalize sabotage and crowdsource tactics.
Key Judgments
1. The Montreal call-to-action explicitly seeks to shift from protest to coordinated property destruction, borrowing the “CamOver” playbook to spur copycat vandalism.
Evidence: The post frames camera destruction as a competitive game (“the neighborhood with the most points wins”) running October–November 2025 and urges teams to submit action reports to MTL Counter-Info.
2. The communiqué situates Montreal within a wider, decentralized campaign targeting AI-enabled policing tools.
Evidence: The post highlights SPVM’s adoption of BriefCam Nexus features (multi-camera search, facial/plate recognition, trait search, geo-alerts) and links to mapping sites and zines—tactics seen in recent U.S. incidents in Michigan, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia amplified by Semper Incolumem.
3. By bundling ideology, motivation, and practical guidance, the campaign lowers barriers to participation and increases the risk of low-tech, high-frequency attacks on public and private camera infrastructure.
Evidence: The Montreal post blends anti-surveillance rhetoric with “terms of engagement” and links to external guides; parallel communiqués in U.S. cities document simple, repeatable methods and celebrate replication.
Analysis
The “CamOver 2025” push in Montreal is a textbook example of how contemporary anti-surveillance activism blends propaganda, social incentives, and operational cues to orchestrate diffuse sabotage. By turning camera destruction into a competitive “season,” organizers shift participants from online grievance to in-person action, while anonymized counter-info portals provide a feedback loop that validates and propagates tactics. Montreal’s mention of BriefCam’s analytics suite positions the SPVM’s technology choices as the proximate grievance, aligning with a broader narrative that AI-assisted video tools entrench racialized or “colonial” policing.
This approach mirrors recent U.S. activity where activists target visible, lightly protected systems (e.g., Flock ALPRs). The Montreal call embeds three accelerants: (1) a calendar (Oct–Nov) that creates urgency and cadence; (2) a points system that gamifies vandalism; and (3) links to mapping repositories and how-to zines that reduce the skill threshold. The result is a low-cost, high-impact model: small teams can inflict repeated damage across a wide footprint, imposing outsized maintenance costs and eroding perceived deterrence.
For city agencies and property owners, the risk is less about a single spectacular attack and more about attrition. Hardening measures (camera placement height, shrouds, tamper alarms, lighting, rapid repair contracts) and rapid public communication can help blunt momentum by raising the likelihood of detection and reducing the propaganda value of visible damage. Parallel community messaging that explains the public-safety value of non-investigative uses (e.g., missing persons, critical incident review) may also reduce ambient support for vandalism, though any missteps in deployment or policy will be immediately weaponized by organizers.
The Montreal post’s explicit references to facial recognition, license-plate recognition, and trait search underscore a policy gap: absent clear governance (access logs, retention limits, independent audits, public transparency), officials face an uphill fight in countering “surveillance creep” claims. Transparent controls, publicly posted usage policies, and oversight mechanisms can help address legitimate civil-liberties concerns while isolating advocates of criminal damage.
