Telegram Channel Publishes “Operation Morning D.E.W.” Target List, Urges Attacks on U.S. “Weather Weapons”
Executive Summary
A conspiracist Telegram network linked to Veterans on Patrol (VOP) is circulating “Operation Morning D.E.W.” posts that list dozens of GPS coordinates for U.S. infrastructure—mischaracterized as “military weather weapons”—and calls followers to form a “brigade” and take “boots-on-the-ground” action to disable or destroy targets. The campaign escalates from grievance to mobilization by mixing pseudo-legal justifications, religious framing, and explicit recruitment of U.S. veterans, heightening risks of low-tech sabotage and stochastic violence.
Key Judgments
1. “Operation Morning D.E.W.” operationalizes conspiracy narratives into calls for real-world targeting of government infrastructure.
Evidence: The Telegram posts provide multiple lists of precise GPS coordinates under the banner “MILITARY WEAPONS SELECTED FOR OPERATION MORNING D.E.W.” and direct readers to “find a weapon near you,” while urging sign-ups to “The Brigade” and offering contact numbers for “boots on the ground.” The content frames NEXRAD weather radars and related sites as “bioweapons” and “directed energy weapons.”
2. The campaign’s veteran-centric recruitment and pseudo-legal framing are designed to lower inhibition barriers and confer perceived legitimacy for sabotage.
Evidence: Messages appeal to military veterans (#VeteransOnPatrol), cite Title 50 U.S.C. § 1520a to claim it is “not unlawful” to destroy the alleged “weapons,” and present activity as a “counter-offensive” against “military treason.” Companion narratives from VOP’s prior “Operation Leaning Tower” similarly urge “disabling” weather infrastructure while avoiding overtly explosive methods.
3. The scale and specificity of shared target data raise the risk of copycat, low-tech interference against dispersed, lightly protected systems.
Evidence: The channel publishes dozens of discrete coordinate points across multiple states, repeatedly labeling them as “weapons” to be “immediately destroyed” during future crises. Prior VOP messaging provides moral encouragement, recruitment pathways, and operational tone that together create a permissive environment for individual actors to attempt tampering or vandalism.
Analysis
“Operation Morning D.E.W.” exemplifies how conspiratorial ecosystems convert fringe beliefs into mobilization. By misidentifying weather and communications infrastructure as “military weapons” and enumerating GPS coordinates, the network transforms abstract grievance into a tangible target set. The messaging borrows from sovereign-style pseudo-legal rhetoric—asserting a right to destroy government property—while invoking religious duty and child-protection themes to moralize participation. That blend is tailored to recruit disaffected veterans and adjacent militia-curious audiences, leveraging perceived credibility and tactical familiarity to move supporters from online affirmation to real-world action.
The campaign’s emphasis on “brigade” building and “boots on the ground” channels suggests intent to create a loose operational scaffold rather than a tightly commanded effort, which aligns with past militia and accelerationist patterns. Even absent centralized capacity, the diffusion of specific coordinates across numerous jurisdictions increases the likelihood of opportunistic, low-tech attacks—cutting cables, breaching perimeters, sabotaging power or comms feeds—particularly at rural sites that lack robust physical security. These acts need not be sophisticated to produce outsized disruption for meteorological services, aviation safety support, or regional emergency warning systems.
The narrative continuity with VOP’s “Operation Leaning Tower” is notable. That earlier campaign explicitly urged “disabling” NEXRAD systems while avoiding arson or explosives—advice intended to keep actions below certain prosecutorial thresholds while still achieving disruption. “Morning D.E.W.” expands the scope and intensity: it multiplies targets, introduces lists that purport to be “weapons selected,” and adds recruitment calls with phone numbers and branded hashtags, increasing discoverability and cohesion among sympathizers.
From a risk-management perspective, the threat profile is characterized by: (1) decentralized actors with variable competence, (2) dispersed, soft targets, (3) a propaganda engine normalizing sabotage as “defensive,” and (4) the possibility of colliding with law enforcement or site personnel during attempted interference. Mitigation hinges on rapid information sharing between federal, state, and local partners; discreet hardening of priority sites (locks, lighting, tamper alarms, camera coverage, vegetation clearance); community awareness for suspicious activity near radomes and comms compounds; and digital monitoring of coordination nodes to cue preventive patrols. Public messaging should correct disinformation about “weather weapons” without amplifying specific target details, focusing instead on the public-safety functions those systems provide.
Bottom line: the campaign lowers the barrier to action for conspiracy-motivated individuals by pairing coordinates with moral and pseudo-legal pretexts. Even if most adherents remain online-only, the small fraction willing to act can generate real-world disruptions and safety risks.
