Hamas Issues Warning Highlighting Israeli Intelligence Techniques
Executive Summary
Hamas’s internal security wing has issued a stark warning about alleged Israeli efforts to recruit operatives in Gaza through covert operations disguised as humanitarian initiatives. In a coordinated set of statements, the group accused Israel of exploiting aid delivery networks, deploying spyware apps, and sending deceptive WhatsApp messages to compromise Gaza’s internal cohesion and collect intelligence.
Analysis
On May 28, 2025, Hamas’s internal front released a statement accusing Israel of attempting to rebuild a “Lahad-style militia” in Gaza—a reference to the former South Lebanon Army, an Israeli-backed proxy force. According to the statement, Israeli intelligence is allegedly recruiting fugitives and criminal elements in Gaza to serve as mercenary cells under misleading banners such as “Gaza Protection Committees.” These groups are accused of escorting Israeli forces, stealing aid, and sowing internal discord while presenting themselves as humanitarian facilitators.
The statement also warned that these actors have access to Israeli military gear and media tools, suggesting a high level of coordination. Hamas alleges that these operatives aim to disrupt aid flows and shift blame onto the resistance, thus fracturing public trust and undermining their legitimacy.
In tandem, Hamas’s internal security division issued prior alerts about digital infiltration methods. On April 29, the group warned of malicious applications disguised as service tools on app stores, which allegedly function as spyware designed by hostile intelligence services. Citizens were urged to download only from verified platforms, review app permissions carefully, and report any suspicious activity to authorities.
A follow-up warning on April 30 addressed a new tactic: Israeli intelligence operatives posing as civilians to send friendly, seemingly benign WhatsApp messages. These are framed as a ploy to draw targets into extended conversations for either blackmail or recruitment. Hamas emphasized that interaction with such messages constitutes collaboration and could endanger lives.
The three warnings point to a larger trend: the shift in Israeli intelligence priorities toward psychological and information warfare, particularly as Gaza becomes more difficult to penetrate via traditional means. Hamas’s public messaging appears aimed not just at informing the population, but also at reasserting its own control over Gaza’s social and informational landscape in the face of Israeli intelligence operations.
By framing these alleged tactics as part of a broader psychological and strategic campaign, Hamas seeks to bolster vigilance among Gazans while reinforcing its monopoly over legitimate resistance activities. The messaging also casts any non-aligned armed groups or collaborators as traitors, raising the stakes for anyone tempted to work outside the resistance structure. This rhetoric taps into a broader historical narrative—particularly the Lebanese experience—to discourage fragmentation and maintain public solidarity.
