U.S.-Brokered “Washington Accord” Between Congo and Rwanda Seeks to End War and Rewire Africa’s Critical Minerals Market
Executive Summary
The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda signed a U.S.-mediated peace deal in Washington, aiming to end decades of armed conflict in eastern Congo and facilitate American access to critical minerals. While the agreement signals diplomatic progress, the exclusion of key actors such as the M23 rebels raises doubts about its enforceability and long-term impact on regional security.
Strategic Analysis
On June 27, 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda signed a high-stakes peace agreement in Washington under U.S. auspices, dubbed the “Washington Accord.” The deal includes provisions for Rwandan troop withdrawal, the disarmament and reintegration of armed groups, and regional economic integration focused on critical mineral supply chains. It follows an aggressive M23 offensive, reportedly backed by Rwanda, which captured strategic cities such as Goma and Bukavu—key nodes in Congo’s mineral-rich east.
The U.S. role, championed by President Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, reflects a dual strategic ambition: stabilizing a volatile region while securing access to minerals vital for global technologies. With the Democratic Republic of Congo holding an estimated $24 trillion in untapped mineral wealth—including cobalt, tantalum, and lithium—the deal is as much an economic pact as a security arrangement.
Yet, the peace deal suffers from several structural vulnerabilities. Most notably, the M23 rebels—central players in the conflict—have publicly stated that the agreement does not apply to them. This undermines the enforceability of any demobilization or territorial control provisions. Additionally, Rwanda’s rhetorical insistence on defensive posture, coupled with vague language around troop disengagement, suggests limited willingness to concede ground militarily or diplomatically.
Past peace deals in the Great Lakes region have often collapsed due to ambiguous enforcement mechanisms and unresolved ethnic grievances, particularly linked to the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The presence of the FDLR, a Hutu militia with genocidal roots, continues to be cited by Kigali as justification for incursions into eastern Congo. This cyclical dynamic remains largely unaddressed in the new accord.
While the U.S. has threatened “severe penalties” for violations, the credibility and durability of American commitment are uncertain, especially amid broader U.S.-China competition in Africa. The economic incentives embedded in the deal—U.S. access to Congo’s mineral markets—may align Washington’s interests with Congolese stability, but they also risk incentivizing short-term resource extraction over long-term governance reform.
The Qatari-mediated parallel track and references to ongoing Doha negotiations provide a multi-layered diplomatic framework, but these are still early-stage processes. Moreover, the recent expulsion of Rwanda from its ECCAS rotational presidency underlines the deep mistrust and regional polarization that this peace deal must overcome.
The Washington Accord represents a diplomatic milestone with potentially significant economic and geopolitical implications. However, its success hinges on sustained enforcement, integration of rebel factions, and genuine regional reconciliation—none of which are guaranteed. It is a fragile start to what must be a prolonged and multidimensional peace-building effort.
