Iran Recruits Israeli Citizen to Manufacture Explosives for Assassination of Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett; Shin Bet Foils Second Plot in One Month

Middle East ConflictAssassination
Written By Matt Helmkamp

Source: Israeli Police

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Israeli Shin Bet security service and national police announced on April 9, 2026 the arrest of a Haifa resident, Ami Gaidarov, 22, on charges of manufacturing 8 to 10 kilograms of explosive material on behalf of an Iranian handler for the purpose of assassinating former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. It is the second Iranian-directed assassination plot against Bennett disrupted within a single month, a pattern Israeli security officials have characterized as a serious escalation in Iranian unconventional targeting.

ANALYSIS

Gaidarov was recruited by an Iranian handler in August 2025 and conducted multiple assignments over eight months, receiving significant financial compensation for each. He rented a dedicated apartment in Haifa to serve as an explosives production site and acquired specialized communications equipment to maintain contact with Iranian handlers. The 8 to 10 kilograms of explosive material he produced is sufficient for a vehicle-borne or fixed-site device capable of causing mass casualties. Several additional suspects from northern Israel, including Sergey Libman and Eduard Shovtiyuk, were detained for assisting in material acquisition, concealment, and testing.

Beyond the assassination planning, Gaidarov was tasked with intelligence collection: photographing Haifa port facilities and missile impact sites from earlier in the conflict in northern Israel. This dual role, combining target reconnaissance with local bomb manufacture, reflects a sophisticated Iranian approach that avoids the operational security risks of inserting foreign operatives by recruiting Israeli residents with ties to the Russian-speaking community. The same community has been a focus of Iranian recruitment pressure throughout the conflict.

The choice of Bennett as a target is significant. Bennett served as Prime Minister from 2021 to 2022 and remains a prominent political figure who has been vocal in support of the current military campaign against Iran. Targeting a former head of government during an active war signals Iranian intent to impose personal costs on the Israeli political class beyond the battlefield. The second disrupted plot within 30 days suggests either a surge in Iranian tasking or degraded operational security among recruits, and likely both.

Iran's recruitment of Israeli residents through financial incentive, particularly from communities with economic pressures, represents an ongoing counterintelligence challenge that extends beyond Israel. The same tradecraft, long-term social media contact, incremental task escalation, and financial compensation, has been documented in Iranian targeting of US and European nationals. Agencies monitoring Iranian influence operations should treat the Bennett case as a template for ongoing recruitment attempts against figures associated with opposition to Iran.

SOURCES

Matt Helmkamp
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