Bombings, Blame, and Rising Tensions: How the Delhi and Islamabad Attacks Are Deepening the India-Pakistan-Afghanistan Crisis
Executive Summary
Deadly explosions in New Delhi and Islamabad, followed by a foiled attack on a Pakistani cadet college, have pushed South Asia into another period of acute tension. Pakistan is accusing India and Afghan-based militants of orchestrating the violence, while India rejects those charges and focuses on its own terrorism investigation at home. At the same time, Pakistan’s confrontation with the Afghan Taliban and the continuing growth of the Pakistani Taliban’s cross-border operations are turning a security problem into a three-way crisis. Without better intelligence cooperation and quiet diplomacy, the risk of miscalculation between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan will remain uncomfortably high.
Intelligence Analysis
Between November 10–12, 2025, three linked developments signaled a sharp deterioration in the regional security climate:
In New Delhi, a car explosion near the historic Red Fort on November 10 killed at least eight to ten people and injured dozens, prompting India to open a terrorism investigation under its main anti-terror law and to label the explosion a “heinous terror incident.”
In Wana, South Waziristan, on November 10, a five-man suicide assault team attacked a military-linked cadet college. A vehicle bomb breached the gate and armed attackers attempted to enter the facility before Pakistani troops killed all five, in a fight that lasted many hours.
In Islamabad on November 11, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive vest next to a police vehicle outside a district court, killing 12 people and injuring more than two dozen.
These attacks stand out not only for their casualties, but for where they occurred. Large bombings are relatively rare in the heavily guarded capitals of India and Pakistan. Their almost back-to-back timing amplifies fears that militant groups are both rebuilding capacity and expanding their ambitions beyond remote border regions.
The Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan safe haven
According to Pakistani reporting, the Wana attack was carried out by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, which has long operated from sanctuaries across the Afghan border. The tactic—a vehicle bomb to breach a gate followed by armed attackers—matches previous TTP operations against security and educational targets.
The Islamabad court bombing is more contested. A faction of the TTP, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, initially claimed responsibility before another commander publicly contradicted that claim. The main TTP leadership officially denied involvement, a pattern seen in previous attacks where splinters act semi-independently while still drawing on the broader network’s infrastructure.
Pakistan, however, has framed the threat differently. Since 2024, its government and military have increasingly referred to “Fitna al Khwarij” and “Fitna al Hindustan” as supposed terror fronts backed by India. Officials now label these as “Indian proxies” and describe the Wana and Islamabad attacks as examples of Indian state-sponsored terrorism, while also blaming the Afghan Taliban for allowing the TTP and related factions to operate from Afghan territory.
In response to the Islamabad bombing, Pakistan has announced the arrests of four men it describes as part of an “Afghan cell” linked to a TTP faction. Authorities say the suicide bomber was an Afghan citizen from Nangarhar province, and that the cell received instructions via encrypted messaging from a TTP commander based in Afghanistan. The Afghan Taliban government has expressed sorrow and condemnation for the attacks but has not accepted any responsibility and continues to deny that TTP elements are being sheltered on Afghan soil.
This three-way dynamic is crucial. Pakistan backed the Afghan Taliban for decades, hoping a friendly Kabul would secure its western flank and help restrain anti-Pakistani militants. Instead, after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Pakistan has faced a renewed wave of cross-border attacks and a more confident TTP using Afghanistan as a rear base. The relationship between Islamabad and Kabul has deteriorated into cross-border strikes, deadly clashes, and a fragile ceasefire brokered by Qatar and Turkey that now looks increasingly fragile.
India’s domestic shock and measured public stance
On the Indian side, the Delhi car bombing has shaken a capital that still lives with the memory of major attacks in 2001 and 2008. The blast occurred near Red Fort, a symbolically important site where India’s prime minister gives the annual Independence Day address. The government immediately framed it as a terror incident and handed the case to the National Investigation Agency.
Police actions have focused heavily on Kashmir and nearby states. Authorities seized a large cache of explosives earlier in November in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, arresting several suspects in what they describe as a militant cell. Days later, an accidental explosion at a police station in Srinagar killed nine people and injured many others while forensic teams were handling unstable materials believed to be linked to the Delhi case. That mishap underscores both the scale of the material involved and the pressures on security services.
So far, New Delhi has not officially accused Pakistan or any specific group of directing the Red Fort blast, even as some media and social media voices in India quickly pointed to alleged links to Pakistan-based militants. Analysts note that the Indian government appears cautious about triggering another rapid cycle of accusation and retaliation like the conflict earlier this year over the deadly Pahalgam attack in Kashmir. That April incident, which killed 26 civilians, led to several days of intense cross-border strikes in May. A ceasefire was only restored after outside mediation.
This restraint reflects two competing pressures on India’s leadership. Internationally, New Delhi is managing tense trade disputes with the United States and sensitive relations with China. Domestically, it faces strong political pressure, including from nationalist constituencies, to respond forcefully if any Pakistan connection is established. For now, India seems intent on completing its investigation before taking explicit public positions about responsibility.
Blame, narratives, and the “proxy war” frame
In contrast, Pakistan has already moved firmly into the public blame phase. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and senior ministers have called the Islamabad attack and the Wana assault products of an Indian-backed network operating from Afghanistan. Pakistan has also folded these incidents into a wider narrative that portrays India as the sponsor of militant violence across multiple fronts, including Balochistan and now the capital itself.
At the same time, Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of acting as a proxy of India, alleging that Kabul is cooperating, directly or indirectly, with Indian intelligence against Pakistani interests. This marks a significant shift from earlier years when the Afghan Taliban was viewed in Islamabad as a counterweight to Indian influence in Afghanistan. Today, Pakistan sees itself encircled: India to the east, a hostile or at least uncooperative Taliban government to the west, and cross-border militants exploiting both directions.
India rejects this narrative as an attempt to divert domestic attention from Pakistan’s internal turmoil, military dominance, and economic strain. Indian statements highlight Pakistan’s history of supporting militant groups and paint Islamabad as an irresponsible security actor now facing the blowback of its own policies.
Afghanistan, for its part, rejects both the Indian and Pakistani claims. The Taliban government insists it is not hosting TTP or any group attacking neighbors, and that its territory is being wrongly blamed when violence elsewhere spikes. Kabul also resents Pakistani deportations of Afghan refugees and recent airstrikes, which it sees as violations of Afghan sovereignty.
The lack of a shared reality about who is responsible for these attacks, and where command and control actually sit, makes practical cooperation almost impossible. Every side sees its own grievances as primary and the others’ concerns as cover for strategic moves.
The nuclear and military backdrop
These bombings occur against the backdrop of a particularly tense year in South Asia. In May, India and Pakistan fought their most serious clashes in decades around Kashmir, involving missiles, artillery, and aerial engagements. Later, Pakistan’s army chief made highly public and provocative nuclear comments while visiting the United States, signaling a willingness to invoke nuclear risk in political messaging.
Both India and Pakistan have sizeable nuclear arsenals and delivery systems that fully cover each other’s territory. That reality tends to keep crises below the threshold of all-out war, but it also makes every exchange of fire more dangerous, because misreading intentions or misidentifying responsibility could have cascading effects. When senior leaders speak openly about nuclear options, even in exaggerated terms, it lowers the psychological barrier to risk-taking in a crisis.
Continued border skirmishes with Afghanistan add another layer. Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban have exchanged airstrikes and ground fire in recent months, and many civilians have been killed along the frontier. Each new terrorist incident that Pakistan ties back to Afghan-based militants adds pressure on Islamabad to act, even if action risks another round of cross-border fighting.
Regional and international responses
Major external powers are watching closely. China’s foreign minister has offered condolences separately to India and Pakistan and reiterated Beijing’s opposition to all forms of terrorism, while calling for regional cooperation. China has deep ties with Pakistan and growing interests with India, giving it an incentive to prevent uncontrolled escalation.
The United States previously mediated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan earlier this year and retains influence with both, though relations are complicated by trade disputes and broader strategic rivalry. Qatar and Turkey have played roles in brokering understandings between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban. If tensions rise further, these outside actors will likely be called on again to encourage restraint and facilitate back-channel talks.
Why this matters and what comes next
These events collectively highlight several key risks for the near term:
Militant reach into capitals: Successful or attempted attacks in Delhi and Islamabad show that militants can still breach layered security in major cities. This may embolden groups to plan further high-profile operations, especially if they see political benefits in inflaming regional tensions.
Three-way mistrust: India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan share borders and overlapping militant threats, but they do not share intelligence in a sustained way. Every attack is quickly framed as an instrument of another state’s strategy, rather than as part of a shared extremist problem. That makes coordinated disruption of networks much harder.
Escalation through misattribution: Pakistan’s public accusations of Indian sponsorship, India’s past readiness to strike across the border in response to attacks, and Afghanistan’s tense standoff with Pakistan all create the possibility that one more major incident could trigger military action based on incomplete or politicized intelligence.
Internal pressures: Pakistan faces political turmoil, an empowered military, and public anger over violence and economic hardship. India faces public demands for strong responses to terrorism alongside complex foreign policy calculations. The Afghan Taliban faces a deteriorating economy and resistance from armed groups while seeking international recognition. These pressures make quick, symbolic actions more attractive than slow, cooperative solutions.
In the short run, more intensive counterterrorism operations are likely in Pakistan’s northwest and in Indian-administered Kashmir, along with further arrests linked to the recent bombings. Pakistan may increase coercive measures against Afghan nationals and step up pressure on Kabul over TTP activity. India will probably prioritize concluding its investigation before taking a definitive public stance on external responsibility for the Red Fort blast, though any clear link to a Pakistan-based group may bring calls for a calibrated military response.
At the same time, regional diplomacy is not entirely absent. Fragile ceasefires, quiet talks in neutral venues, and external mediation have all helped pull South Asia back from the brink before. The question is whether political leaders in all three capitals are willing to accept short-term restraint and mutual discomfort in exchange for longer-term stability.
Analyst Note
Pakistan’s decision to rebrand the TTP as “Fitna al Khwarij” or “Fitna al Hindustan,” and to publicly label it an Indian proxy, is more than just rhetoric. It reflects a broader effort to shift responsibility for its jihadist problem outward—toward India and Afghanistan—while downplaying decades of domestic support for militant actors. This narrative may play well at home but makes it much harder to build the quiet, practical cooperation with neighbors that is essential for dismantling real cross-border networks.
