Cartel Drone Warfare on the U.S. Southern Border: How Criminal Groups Are Importing Battlefield Tactics
Executive Summary
Drug cartels in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America are rapidly adopting military-style drone tactics learned from conflicts such as the war in Ukraine. They are using low-cost drones for surveillance, smuggling, and increasingly for explosive attacks against officials and rivals near the U.S. border. At the same time, U.S. agencies and local law enforcement are racing to build their own drone and counter-drone capabilities, while the U.S. military is using armed drones against suspected trafficking boats at sea. This emerging drone contest along the southern border raises urgent questions about homeland security, regional stability, and how quickly U.S. and partner governments can adapt.
Intelligence Analysis
What is happening now
A series of recent incidents shows that cartel drone warfare is no longer experimental and no longer confined to remote areas of Mexico. In October 2025, three drones carrying homemade explosive devices struck the grounds of the Baja California state police installation in Tijuana, targeting the anti-kidnapping unit near the U.S. border. The drones dropped bottles packed with nails, pellets, and metal pieces, damaging vehicles and prompting a security warning from the U.S. Consulate. Authorities are investigating the attack as an act of terrorism and believe it may be linked to earlier arson attacks against police facilities in the region.
This was not an isolated event. Earlier reports describe an explosive drone ambush in Chihuahua that injured Mexican soldiers and a police officer. Another attack in southern Mexico in 2024 killed and injured multiple people when drones were used to drop improvised explosive devices. Mexican officials and analysts have tracked a sharp rise in such incidents since 2023, with drug cartels increasingly using drones for both reconnaissance and direct attacks.
What makes these trends more alarming is the type of drones and tactics involved. Cartels are shifting from simple commercial quadcopters dropping grenades to “first-person view” drones, in which the pilot sees the drone’s perspective through goggles or a screen. These first-person view (FPV) drones can be flown like remote-controlled racing machines, then crashed into a target as a one-way explosive weapon. They can be built from off-the-shelf parts for a few hundred dollars, armed with small explosive payloads, and piloted with skills developed on widely available simulators.
Learning from Ukraine and other conflicts
There are growing indications that cartels are not just copying what they see online but actively seeking advanced training. Intelligence reporting suggests that individuals linked to Mexican cartels traveled to Ukraine’s International Legion under the appearance of joining the fight against Russia, but with the real goal of gaining hands-on experience with FPV attack drones. Some assessments also point to possible involvement of Colombian armed groups and even training support from Russia to certain non-state actors.
Ukraine has become a global laboratory for drone warfare. There, FPV drones have been turned into precision-guided weapons, supported by networks of volunteer builders, improvised production lines, and constant battlefield feedback. Operators have experimented with using larger drones as airborne signal relays, integrating simple artificial intelligence to help drones stay on target when jamming occurs, and tethering drones with fiber-optic cable to resist electronic interference. While not all of these methods are likely to appear in Latin America, they provide a ready-made playbook for ambitious groups.
For cartels whose drone tactics once lagged far behind those of military forces, access to this kind of training could shrink that gap from years to months. Instead of learning through trial and error, they can import tactics, techniques, and designs that have already been proven in a major war.
Drones in broader cartel warfare
Latin American criminal organizations are not passive imitators. They are already innovators in other areas, including semi-submersible “narco-submarines,” heavily armored “narco-tanks,” covert smuggling compartments in trucks, and long-range communications using satellite internet. The reported seizure in Colombia of a remotely operated semi-submersible vessel equipped with satellite communications shows how quickly unmanned systems are being applied to drug trafficking at sea.
On land, Mexican cartels have combined drones with armored vehicles, trenches, roadside bombs, and coordinated assaults that resemble crude versions of modern combined-arms tactics. Evidence from Mexico shows “narco-tanks” fitted with makeshift cages to protect against drone-dropped munitions, similar to the so-called “cope cages” seen on tanks in Ukraine and Russia. Some vehicles reportedly carry their own jammers to interfere with enemy drones. Cartel fighters have also been seen carrying portable jamming equipment and other electronic warfare tools.
These developments suggest that drones are being integrated into a broader fighting system rather than used as stand-alone gadgets. In practice, this could mean drones scouting enemy positions, shaping the battlefield with explosives, and then guiding armored vehicles and gunmen into better attack positions. As cartel tactics mature, the risk grows that they could more effectively challenge state forces in rural and urban areas alike.
The situation at the U.S.–Mexico border
The United States is already seeing the effects of this shift at its southern border. Senior officials have testified that thousands of cartel drones are flying near or over the border every year, often between late evening and early morning. These flights are used to map patrol routes, monitor the location of U.S. agents, guide migrants or smugglers, and test responses.
On the U.S. side, law enforcement agencies are turning to drones to compensate for manpower shortages and budget constraints. Local departments in Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico use drones to investigate crime scenes, search for missing people, monitor remote desert areas, and assist in rescues along dangerous terrain. Border counties are partnering with companies that supply drones capable of long flight times, thermal imaging, and artificial intelligence tools that can process imagery and help direct officers on the ground.
At the same time, the U.S. federal government is trying to build a layered defense against hostile drones. The Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Border Patrol are exploring counter-drone systems that combine radio-frequency sensors, radar, and high-resolution cameras to detect and track small drones. Some systems can distinguish between “friendly” drones operated by authorities and unknown or hostile drones. Others feed data directly to jammers or other mitigation tools, enabling agents to disrupt a drone’s control link or, in some cases, guide kinetic methods such as small arms or specialized interceptors.
Private-sector systems advertised for border security emphasize multi-sensor detection, automated tracking, and integration with weapons or jamming devices. These systems can be deployed in fixed installations at ports of entry, set up quickly as expeditionary kits in remote areas, mounted on vehicles for mobile patrols, or deployed as rapid-response trailers to protect high-risk locations.
Military operations and the maritime front
Beyond the land border, the U.S. military has opened a new front against suspected drug traffickers at sea. Since September 2025, U.S. forces have conducted dozens of strikes against alleged trafficking boats in the Caribbean and Pacific using armed drones and manned aircraft. The MQ-9 Reaper, a large remotely piloted aircraft, is the primary platform, firing precision-guided Hellfire missiles at suspected smuggling vessels. AC-130 gunships and fighter jets have also been used in some operations.
These strikes have destroyed multiple boats and killed dozens of people, according to public reporting. The U.S. military has positioned drones, fighters, and at least one gunship at bases in Puerto Rico and El Salvador to reach trafficking routes more easily. While these actions are aimed at curbing the drug trade, they also illustrate a broader shift: Washington is willing to employ military-grade drone power against what it now labels as terrorist-designated cartels and criminal networks.
However, these operations raise questions that intersect directly with the evolving drone threat. Cartels seeing their boats destroyed from the air may feel more pressure to strike back in asymmetric ways. Weaponized drones offer one such avenue, especially if cartels perceive U.S. agents, facilities, or assets near the border as responsible for targeting their networks.
Implications and near-term outlook
Taken together, these trends point to a future in which drone warfare is a normal feature of both cartel operations and government responses in the Western Hemisphere. Several implications stand out in the near term:
Threat to U.S. personnel and infrastructure: Even a single successful explosive drone attack on a U.S. border patrol station, convoy, or critical node could cause casualties, disrupt operations, and have major political impact. The capability already exists just across the border.
Pressure on Mexican and regional sovereignty: As cartels refine their ability to combine drones with armored vehicles, explosives, and communications, they could further erode state control over territory, especially in rural or contested areas.
Risk of escalation and collateral damage: As Latin American militaries adopt their own armed drones, often with limited experience and legal guidance, there is a danger of civilian casualties and further erosion of trust in state institutions.
Intelligence and training race: Tracking the movement of drone operators, trainers, and parts will become as important as tracking bulk drug shipments. Identifying and removing skilled drone pilots can have a disproportionate effect on cartel capabilities.
Technology diffusion: Innovations developed to protect the border — such as integrated counter-drone networks — may later be needed to protect critical infrastructure deeper inside the United States, including power plants, pipelines, and mass gathering sites.
In the short term, cartels are likely to continue probing defenses, experimenting with FPV strikes, and integrating drones into local conflicts in Mexico and Colombia. The pace of change is measured in weeks and months, not years. The United States and its partners will need to move just as quickly to update laws, invest in technology, and coordinate efforts across law enforcement, intelligence, and defense.
Analyst Note
The most important feature of this emerging threat is not any single drone model or incident, but the speed at which non-state groups are learning, sharing, and applying combat techniques once limited to professional militaries. That pace of adaptation is what will test U.S. and partner governments in the years ahead.
